Access to Energy

SECRECY AND SECURITY

Edward Teller has argued for decades that secrecy in American defense programs has been counterproductive. Secrecy limits the number of American scientists who can think productively about problems involving the defense of our nation. It also provides a false sense of security. Instead of building civil and strategic defenses and developing the best technology for defense, America has relied, in part, upon maintaining a monopoly of technical knowledge about weapons of mass destruction. Figure 1 from "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand'' by Michael M. May published in American Scientist, 82 November-December p 526-537 (1994) shows how well this policy has worked. A new nuclear-weapons state has been added every five years.

While it is sensible to limit the rate of proliferation of potentially dangerous scientific knowledge, it is also dangerous to delude oneself with the belief that such knowledge can be sequestered forever.

Programs to be first to develop technology and limitations on the rate of spread of some technologies buy time while we implement defensive measures that can protect us from misuse of those technologies. It is the nature of scientific knowledge, however, that ultimately knowledge becomes generally known. Pretending otherwise has put Americans in a dangerous position regarding the risks of chemical, biological, and nuclear technology in incidents of terrorism and war.



 • Conservation of Energy
 • ENERGY EFFICIENCY
 • SECRECY AND SECURITY
 • NO PLACE TO STAND?
 • SAXON MATH
 • DANGERS OF DIOXANE
 • INCREASING ACCESS TO ENERGY
 • STARK RAVING MAD
 • GOOD READING
 • OREGON INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND MEDICINE
Vol. 22, No. 4

Newsletter: Access to Energy Newsletter Archive
Volume: Issues
Issue/No.: Vol. 22, No. 4

Date: December 01, 1994 02:48 PM (For actual publication date see newsletter.)
Title: Conservation of Energy

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