PLUTONIUM RECYCLE

An example of such a policy is the NRC's decision (or "provisional" view, for they're not sure how far they can go with this game) of May 8 not to adopt an environmental impact statement on the use of mixed uranium-plutonium fuels until related questions of plutonium safeguards (against theft) are resolved.

On the face of it, this sounds reasonable enough, for security at reprocessing plants and in shipments from it is not planned as well as it might be. But the NRC's decision does not simply hold up the issue of plutonium safeguards; it holds up everything else in preparing the commercial fuel cycle, and it actually increases the risks, since plutonium and other fission products, instead of being recycled into new fuel to be burned up, will be lying around the country in nuclear plants, which are running out of space for keeping the used fuel rods in safe places.

It should be noted that the question of safeguards against theft is a comparatively minor point in the entire recycling process. A system reducing the risk of theft below reasonable values would add about 0.4% to the fuel cost as a whole, and less than 8% to the cost of recycling.

The logical decision would have been to rule on the many other issues and to continue with licensing procedures short of granting a license, so that only plutonium safeguards need be considered for granting a license by the time (end of next year, it is hoped) adequate safeguards have been worked out.

Three independent studies commissioned by the Atomic Industrial Forum and released last month show that if the NRC's trial balloon decision is implemented and the licensing of plutonium reprocessing facilities delayed by two years, the resulting gap in the fuel cycle would last until the mid-1980's; it would also cost the electric utilities, and hence the consumer, $750 million. By 1985, the additional uranium consumption necessitated by the persisiting lack of plutonium recycle would amount to the equivalent of one billion barrels of oil per year.